A Common PERSPECTIVE

**US Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center Doctrine Division's Newsletter**

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FUTURE JOINT OPERATIONS

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FROM THE EDITOR

"The best way to guarantee peace is to redefine war on our terms."
President George W. Bush

The last time that <u>A Common Perspective</u> addressed the future was the October 1996 issue devoted to *Joint Vision (JV) 2010*. This issue provides some perspectives on future joint doctrine, and the associated challenge of attaining the capabilities of *JV 2020*. The doctrine purists of the world insist that there is no such thing as future doctrine, that doctrine is embedded in the past and present— future concepts don't help the warfighter win today's battle. This is the doctrinaire view. (See *Webster's New World Dictionary* entry on "doctrinaire.") There is a lot of truth in that view, but we also must avoid the strong potential for doctrine to become dogma. Conversely, allowing the futurists of the world free reign on defining future warfare without some doctrinal shaping has the potential for getting it all wrong. It's acceptable (and encouraged) to work outside of the box, while being cautious not to destroy the box altogether.

> *Friction is inherent between a system based on extant capabilities and time-tested principles, and a futures process using notional capabilities and unverified ideas.*

Therein is the new challenge for the doctrine agencies of the world, getting the strategists/tacticians and the futurists engaged in a vision implementation process that fosters unconstrained thinking, yet sorts out the truths about how to fight tomorrow's battles. It's more than just process, but if we don't have that piece right we may set ourselves up for failure. It's very likely that the year 2020 won't look like what is described in JV 2020, and that's acceptable, as long as the right mix of forces and capabilities is fielded to achieve **full spectrum dominance**.

Organizational structure for transformation is equally important. There is no standard model, but military leaders should consider both staff structure and staffing. They should weigh the benefits (and drawbacks) of consolidating concept and doctrine functions within the same staff element, and getting the right mix of futurists/warfighters to develop and implement the vision. Another key consideration is **team orientation**, that is, determining whether to organize around the current joint doctrine hierarchy, vision tenets (e.g., dominant maneuver), joint mission areas, or joint force capabilities, etc.

No radical process or organizational changes have been undertaken at the Joint Warfighting Center. Nevertheless, the Doctrine Division is positioned to support and enable the transition of emerging concepts and capabilities to joint doctrine. To leverage the interaction, Doctrine Division has; along with USJFCOM J8 (Strategy, Requirements and Integration), J9 (Joint Experimentation), and external agencies; identified POCs for monitoring major requirements/ acquisition programs and joint concept experiments. The Doctrine Division also designated one person whose primary responsibility is future concepts and doctrine. Major responsibilities include doctrine support of joint vision implementation plans and developing "transformational doctrine." The first project in this vein is the USJFCOM *Pamphlet for Future Joint Operations*, described in more detail on page 6. The Doctrine Division's goal is to ensure that joint doctrine is prepared to be a key element in redefining war on our terms.

The Commander of the Joint Warfighting Center and the editors appreciate your interest in <u>A Common Perspective</u>, and look forward to your future contributions.

Nathan Toth, Lt Col, USAF
Executive Editor

Josiah McSpedden & Bob Hubner
Managing Editors

IN THIS ISSUE

MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDER, USJFCOM JWFC

By MG William S. Wallace, USA

In conjunction with the theme of the 27th Joint Doctrine Working Party, our focus in this issue is future joint doctrine and operations. Given that doctrine is based on enduring, time-tested principles and existing capabilities, this might sound like a contradiction in terms. Nevertheless, doctrine also plays a less understood role as "an engine of change," described in JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, as "an important method for implementing change…" in which the continuous application of "…joint doctrine in training and leader development encourages development of new and innovative capabilities."

In pursuit of that "change," the joint community is devoting significant effort and talent to "transformation," the process to define, develop, and field the force required to meet the military challenges of the 21st century. For USJFCOM, transformation is embedded in our vision statement: "US Joint Forces Command leads the transformation of the United States Armed Forces to achieve full spectrum dominance as described in *Joint Vision 2020*."

USJFCOM's diverse missions in the *Unified Command Plan* are a unique blend of geographic and functional tasks, and its organization reflects that duality. Our expanded role in transformation drives an internal structure that places significant resources in the J7 (Joint Training), J8 (Strategy, Requirements, Integration), and J9 (Joint Experimentation) directorates—the staffs most heavily engaged in advocating jointness and oriented to the future. However, the entire USJFCOM staff is focusing on key events such as the UNIFIED VISION 01 and MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 02 experiments and exercises, and concepts like rapid decisive operations (RDO).

The RDO concept will be the initial focus of our USJFCOM *Pamphlet for Future Joint Operations*, described in Lt Col Toth's article on page 6. This initiative is a major effort to provide the doctrinal framework for joint force transformation initiatives, and to help achieve the tenets of *Joint Vision 2020*. The article by CAPT Prothero and Mr. Dziubinski (page 9) is a more thorough discussion of the RDO concept. An award-winning article by students from the Joint Forces Staff College challenges the tenet of "dominant maneuver" in *Joint Vision 2020* as a truly new and emerging concept (page 12). Additionally, Mr. Rich Rinaldo from the Exercise Analysis Branch provides a gold mine of information on conducting doctrinal research in this Internet age (page 29).

The mutual challenge for the doctrine and futurist communities will be to fully realize the potential for joint doctrine as an effective engine of change. The joint doctrine development community must be a key participant in helping to operationalize joint visions and concepts for 2020 warfare. The take-aways from the Joint Doctrine Working Party discussions should include ideas on how to make joint doctrine realize its potential as a true engine of change. I look forward to your insights on this challenging task.

USJFCOM JWFC DOC-DIV UPDATES

By Col Robert Hinger, USAF, USJFCOM JWFC, Chief, Doctrine Division

SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS

The past six months have been very productive for the Joint Warfighting Center's Doctrine Division. We spent a great deal of energy enacting the improvements we proposed at last October's Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP)—a reduction in the interim assessment staffing and the streamlining of the revision process. Both of these have paid off in workload savings for the joint doctrine development community. We have cut 80% of the old interim assessment (now early final assessment) requests for feedback (only two of a possible 12 were released), and the JWFC is now committed to writing 75% of the revision first drafts (RFDs) that are in the queue (9 of 12). We will continue to work with the lead agents and Joint Staff doctrine sponsors to refine these efforts to produce timely and relevant joint doctrine.

Doctrine Division's workload associated with the review of allied joint publications (AJPs) roughly has tripled in the last six months. During that time we reviewed 15 AJPs, checking consistency with US joint publications, harmonization with other allied publications, and ensuring the USJFCOM components have an opportunity to provide comments. Mr. Chuck Bellis from Doctrine Support Group (DSG) (OC, Incorporated) coordinates this effort and ensures our input is properly submitted to the Joint Staff (JS) J7/JDETD coordinator, Mr. Harry Simmeth.

Doctrine Division also is the designated custodian for AJP-3.4, *Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*. This publication is similar in content to JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*. LtCol Mike Lambiase from Doctrine Division, assisted by Mr. Chuck Bellis from Doctrine Support Group (OC, Incorporated), is the author. The first study draft is scheduled for release in June 2001.

PERSONNEL

These efforts were possible because of the dedicated and innovative military officers, contractors, and civilians who work in or support the USJFCOM JWFC Doctrine Division. Unfortunately, as the Summer approaches, we will be saying "adios my friend" to three fine doctrinaires.

Col Mike "Harley" Artese, who has been my right hand man and USCINCJFCOM's coordinating review authority this past year, is trading in his red pen for the white plains of Alaska. He is going to be the Deputy Support Group Commander of the 3rd Wing at Elmendorf AFB, AK. COL Rick Steinke, who is the mastermind behind the improvements to assessments and revisions, as well as USCINCJFCOM's representative on two capstone joint publications, is trading joint publications for publications in French. He is going back to language school enroute to Paris, France, as the Army Attaché. COL Rich Cardillo, who brought you the highly successful October 2000 Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP), as well as restructuring our contract to provide more assistance to the field in writing revision first drafts, will assist the Army's *Transformation* effort at Fort Lewis, WA, as the Battlespace Integration Director. We wish them all the best of luck; they provided significant contributions to joint doctrine and its development process. It will be difficult to fill their shoes!

TRANSFORMATION

This issue of <u>A Common Perspective</u> and the May 2001 JDWP are dedicated to thinking about future joint operations and joint doctrine's role with respect to *Transformation*. We are caught in a proverbial (what came first, the chicken or the egg?) debate regarding the best way to make doctrine an "engine of change" as the new version of JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, espouses. If doctrine discusses what we believe is the best way to fight based on historical lessons and time-tested principles, what document tells us what we believe is the best way to fight in the future? Can we afford to "transform the force" and learn costly lessons in combat before we codify the best practices? The classical Descartes' approach argues that sound, well-written joint doctrine will beget new ideas as warfighters understand doctrine and train with the best joint warfighting practices. But, is this a pragmatic approach in an era of instant communication and transparent boundaries? Is there a better way? Can joint doctrine play a more deliberate role? These are the questions we will raise at the 27th JDWP and ones we want to debate and discuss over the next few months to ensure the joint doctrine community is ready to recognize and embrace *Transformation.*

DEVELOPMENT BRANCH

Just two publications were approved this past six months; JP 1, *Joint Warfare for the Armed Forces of the United States*, and JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*. Nevertheless, it was a challenging Winter and Spring, and it will be a very busy

Summer and Fall. There are 17 joint publications (eight under development/nine in revision) that are scheduled for approval in the next six months. See the list on page 17.

If you are looking for information on the development of a particular joint publication, go online to *http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine* and click on the "Joint Publication Status" button. That webpage should provide you the information you want. Otherwise, questions or comments should be directed to CAPT Jim Cox, USN, Chief, Joint Publication Development Branch, at DSN 668-6107 or e-mail: *coxj@jwfc.jfcom.mil*.

ASSESSMENT BRANCH

The October 2000 Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP) voted to have USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) write RFDs and to allow USJFCOM JWFC and the lead agent (LA) to co-chair the associated joint working groups (JWGs). The JWGs convene to resolve critical and major issues resulting from joint publication assessments and review the revision program directives. Since then, USJFCOM JWFC Doctrine Division and the JS J7 agreed that the LA should have first choice in writing the RFD. As of this writing, a change to JP 1-01, *Joint Doctrine Development System*, reflecting the above procedures, is in final coordination by JS J7. The primary effect of this change will be to provide a clear, more efficient timeline from release of the assessment request for feedback message through RFD distribution. Overall, this new procedure will help make joint publication revisions far more responsive to the joint warfighter and THAT is the bottom line!

Since the October 2000 JDWP, we transitioned from the old system of automatically conducting a full interim assessment report for every JP to conducting less rigorous, more focused preliminary assessment reports to determine if a joint publication is a candidate for a full assessment and, consequently, an early revision. The following joint publications received an interim or preliminary assessment and were recommended for a **scheduled five-year revision**: 1-0, *Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations;* 2-02, *National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*; 2-03, *JTTP for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations;* 3-07.3, *JTTP for Peace Operations;* 3-09.1, *JTTP for Laser Designation Operations;* 3-15, *Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare;* 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations;* 3-54, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Security;* 3-59, *Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations;* 4-05.1, *JTTP for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup;* and 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.* JPs 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, and 4-01.6, *JTTP*

for Joint Logistics Over- the-Shore (JLOTS), were assessed and recommended and approved for an **early revision**—both RFDs will be written by the LA.

The following joint publications underwent final assessment and will begin, or are in, the revision process: 3-02.2, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation;* 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War;* 3-07.1, *JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*; 3-50.2, *Doctrine for Combat Search and Rescue;* 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations;* 3-58, *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception;* 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations;* 4-06, *JTTP for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations;* , 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations;* and 6-02, *Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems*. With the exception of JP 5-0, the RFDs will be written by USJFCOM JWFC. Altogether, 9 of the 12 pending RFDs will be written by USJFCOM JWFC Doctrine Division.

The following joint publications are scheduled, as indicated, for preliminary assessments to determine if an early final assessment is warranted:

- June 2001: JP 1-06, *JTTP for Financial Management During Joint Operations*

- September 2001: JPs 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, and 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*

- October 2001: JPs 3-51, *Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare*, and 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*

The following publications will undergo a scheduled final assessment:

- May 2001: JPs 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, and 4-01.2, *JTTP for Sealift Support to Joint Operations*

- July 2001: JPs 3-01.1, *Aerospace Defense of North America*, and 4-02.2, *JTTP for Patient Movement in Joint Operations*

- August 2001: JP 4-01.7, *JTTP for Use of Intermodal Containers in Joint Operations*

We appreciate everyone's efforts in accepting positive change and in making the assessment and revision processes more efficient and responsive to the joint warfighter! Your input is always welcome. Questions and comments should be directed to COL Rick Steinke, USA, Chief, Joint Assessment Branch, at DSN 668-6104 or e-mail: *steinker@jwfc.jfcom.mil*.

By Lt Col Nathan Toth, USAF, USJFCOM JWFC Doctrine Division

> *"The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out."*
>
> **Sir B. H. Liddell Hart,** *Strategy*

OVERVIEW

USJFCOM's *Pamphlet for Future Joint Operations* is a command initiative to produce "future" doctrine, a document that will support transformation initiatives to achieve the capabilities envisioned in *Joint Vision 2020* (*JV 2020*). This article will provide some background about why the publication is being developed, outline the scope and purpose, and briefly discuss the pamphlet's content.

BACKGROUND

In November 2000, a USCINCJFCOM off-site reviewed a command assessment to determine USJFCOM's ability to perform assigned functions and missions. Key to this assessment was USJFCOM's role in the transformation of the US Armed Forces, i.e., what is transformation, and do we have a plan? There was consensus that the current doctrine process must explore ways to improve how it addresses future doctrine (for transformation). In December 2000, the JWFC Doctrine Division gave USCINCJFCOM a joint doctrine update briefing that addressed the off-site implications for joint doctrine. The briefing offered two insights:

- The current joint doctrine process is not ready to support transformation.

- Joint doctrine must be more proactive in influencing doctrine associated with transformation.

Both observations go to the core problem—the joint doctrine development process is focused almost exclusively on existing capabilities, and while it is responsive to change, it is not an effective agent of change, particularly change associated with transformation. JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, states that joint doctrine serves as "an engine of change," and that the application of joint doctrine "encourages development of new and innovative capabilities…that improve on extant capabilities." Nonetheless, JP 1 and JP 1-01, *Joint Doctrine Development System*, lack specific solutions or roadmaps to carry out this mandate for change. Also, joint doctrine's role relative to transformation is not defined.

Traditionally, a number of influences have stimulated the development of new joint doctrine and the revision of existing publications (see Figure 1). These include lessons learned from ongoing operations, new missions reflected in the *Unified Command Plan*, new system requirements defined in Capstone Requirements Documents and Operational Requirements Documents, and senior leader guidance like that contained in the *Defense Planning Guidance* and Presidential Decision Directives. Figure 1 also shows the impact of the relatively new joint vision process on doctrine development. Supported by USJFCOM's Joint Experimentation Program and Service experiments, this process explores concepts in joint experiments and other venues. Joint experiment results are used to recommend changes in the form of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) packages. Joint doctrine development community decisions will be addressed through the joint doctrine development process and result in new or revised joint publications, while decisions on the other package elements will be handled in the appropriate "change" system (such as major system development in the DOD acquisition system).

The joint community needs to address a key question: Is there a better way to structure the current vision implementation process? USJFCOM JWFC discussions on this question concluded that for doctrine to be a true engine of change, it should influence the process at the beginning and operate as a key component throughout *JV 2020* implementation to help:

- Conceptualize future joint operations

- Define desired operational capabilities

- Shape experimentation

- Influence DOTMLPF recommendations

The principal idea presented to USCINCJFCOM in response to the need for an improved process was development of a USJFCOM *Pamphlet for Future Joint Operations*. The document may be a seminal doctrine pamphlet for the future, initially to support the command's Transformation Plan. In addition, the USJFCOM pamphlet is envisioned as a seed document for a potential future JP X that could become a CJCS capstone publication in the joint doctrine hierarchy, thereby influencing the entire range of publications.

SCOPE AND PURPOSE

The pamphlet will be a guide to future joint operations that envisions what the future force needs to look like, and

how it should operate. It will also support joint community efforts to operationalize *JV 2020*, and thus serve in some capacity as a consensus builder among the Services to see how their visions and experiments fit into the larger joint vision. Therefore, it will need to add the next level of detail to *JV 2020* concepts.

The pamphlet will also provide operational-level guidance to combatant commanders, subordinate joint force commanders, and their Service components, and joint experiments/exercises such as MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE (MC) 02. In so doing, it will help link strategic guidance and joint doctrine to joint tactical operations. Initial drafts will use the Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) concept as an important frame of reference. The first drafts will be an operational bridge between the objectives of RDO and the vision of 2020. Feedback from MC 02 that identifies the extent joint forces are able to conduct RDO consistent with *JV 2020* concepts will allow USJFCOM to evaluate the pamphlet

and make necessary improvements to meet overall objectives. It will eventually become part of the USJFCOM integrated DOTMLPF change recommendations developed to support joint force transformation.

The primary purposes of the pamphlet are:

- Provide a strategic and operational doctrine foundation for MC 02 participants. Current joint exercises use joint doctrine as a primary source for training and planning. Similarly, exercises or experiments based on notional futures benefit from having a doctrine foundation that provides boundaries or conditions in which the joint force will operate.

- Form the basis for future joint experimentation and RDO doctrine recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During FY 03, the analysis of MC 02 will be used to help develop DOTMLPF change recommendation packages.


Figure 1. Vision-to-Doctrine Sequence

Figure 1 shows that the USJFCOM pamphlet will contribute to those packages, thus strengthening the relationship between joint concepts and joint doctrine. At the appropriate time in its development, the pamphlet will be forwarded the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration as a new joint publication (capstone transformational publication). In addition, it will continue to undergo USJFCOM refinement for use in shaping follow-on experiments and additional transformational doctrine.

- Describe desired operational capabilities for Service acquisition plans to attain the objective joint force. These will be broadly stated capabilities to complement Joint Staff efforts to flesh out the details of *JV 2020* requirements.

CONTENT

The current outline of the USJFCOM pamphlet is taken primarily from JPs 1, 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, and 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Chapter IV will leverage USJFCOM J9's ongoing work on RDO, and will form the core of the initial document. Some of the more challenging aspects of this chapter include effects-based planning and effects-based operations. In the larger context, operational net assessment, multinational operations, and interagency operations are overarching challenges requiring further appraisal and development, particularly at the strategic and operational levels. Figure 2 provides a brief chapter outline.

SUMMARY

To be an effective agent of change the joint doctrine process must adapt to the needs of joint force transformation. A new kind of doctrine ("capstone transformation doctrine") must be developed by the joint doctrine development community to help shape the work of the futurists and experimenters. The doctrine process must also begin to define the means (roadmap/ methodology) by which joint doctrine can attain its unfulfilled JP 1 mandate to be an "engine of change." The USJFCOM *Pamphlet for Future Joint Operations* is a first step in this direction.

Pamphlet for Future Joint Operations
Chapter Outline

Foreword: The Challenge of the Future
- Strategic and Technological Challenges

Chapter I: Overview of Future Joint Operations

Chapter II: Future Joint Operations
- Characteristics of Future Joint Forces
- Unified Action
- Organization and Command Relationships
- Organization of an Operational Area
- Future Joint Campaigns
- Multinational Operations
- Interagency Operations

Chapter III: Planning Future Joint Operations

Chapter IV: Rapid Decisive Operations
- Knowledge Operations
    — Attaining Information/Decision Superiority
    — Operational Net Assessment
- Coherent Command and Control
    — Effects Based Planning
- Shaping Operations
- Rapid Force Deployment
- Effects Based Operations
- Force Sustainment and Basing
- Transitioning to Post-Conflict Operations

Chapter V: Joint Force Implications
- From Concept to Reality (Summary of Desired Operational Capabilities)

Figure 2. *Pamphlet for Future Joint Operations* Chapter Outline

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USJFCOM JWFC ELECTRONIC RESEARCH LIBRARIES

Using your Internet browser, go to the USJFCOM JWFC Electronic Research Library Home Page at *http://elib1.jwfc.js.mil/,* then follow the directions for access. The full-text search and retrieval libraries are listed below:

- **Peace Operations Research Library -** Contains policy, doctrine, and other guidance, also articles, books, lessons learned, training literature, and includes a special legal section. It addresses the spectrum of military operations other than war.

- **Joint Experimentation Research Library -** Contains policy and other guidance, articles, books, and other literature. It addresses the *Joint Vision 2010* period and beyond.

- **Joint Policy and Doctrine Library -** Contains DOD and joint policy, joint doctrine, and JTTP.

- **Consequence Management Library -** Includes Federal, Interagency, and DOD policy, doctrine, guidance, and other papers related to consequence management operations.

Questions should be referred to Mr. Chuck McGrath at (757) 686-6105 or Mr. Jim Shell at (757) 686-6121. DSN is 668.

By CAPT D. Prothero, USN, and Mr. Mike Dziubinski, USJFCOM Joint Experimentation Directorate, Rapid Decisive Operations Integrated Concept Team

Many would argue about exactly when the Cold War ended, but none dispute the fact that it has ended. Left in its wake is a world full of possibilities and dangers. In the next 50 years the United States will likely not go to war with its former adversary, the Soviet Union. Nor is it probable that two great navies will fight to control strategic lines of communication across the great expansion of oceans. It is equally unlikely that we will use aerospace to deliver the destructive power of sundered atoms. However, it is very likely that our military will be frequently called upon to defend our national interests in less intense conflicts.

While all agree that the Cold War has ended, there is less agreement on what that end has wrought. With the superpower controls removed, many perceive that nationalist and ethnic motivations generate strife, revolution and rebellion. The United States exists in a highly interconnected world and has global interests. Many of these interests, though not always vital, have been repeatedly challenged. These challenges, such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, East Timor, Haiti, Rwanda, and Kuwait have not been, on average, the missions for which our military doctrine, organization, training, material, logistics, personnel, and facilities were designed. Clearly, for our military to best serve our country, we need to redesign how we prepare for and execute our missions.

THE GENESIS

The joint redesign effort is centered on an experimental concept called Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO). While RDO can trace its conceptual lineage back to *Joint Vision (JV) 2010* and the *Concept for Future Joint Operations* generated in the late 90's, its latest iteration is the product of work embarked on as a result of more recent direction.

The April 2000 *Defense Planning Guidance* (DPG) tasked USJFCOM to develop "new warfighting concepts and capabilities that will improve the ability of future joint force commanders to rapidly and decisively conduct particularly challenging and important operational missions, such as . . . coercing an adversary to undertake certain actions or deny the adversary the ability to coerce or attack its neighbor." The *Hart-Rudman Commission Phase II Report* reinforced the call for action by defining a future strategic environment that will require military capabilities that "will result in forces able to deploy rapidly, be employed immediately, and prevail decisively."

This guidance and other observations implicitly recognize that although our military is globally preeminent, it is routinely unable—within the real world of policy constraints—to deliver rapid victory in a small-scale contingency. We owe it to tomorrow's warriors and taxpayers to get it right.

THE ROAD TAKEN

In FY 00, USJFCOM J9 embarked on the following three-pronged effort to identify, combine, or generate operational concept elements that, when integrated, would achieve rapid, decisive operations.

- Expand upon the previous broad search and review of RDO-relevant studies, analyses, experimentation, and observations of actual operations.

- Leverage ongoing Service future concept development and experimentation events.

- Conduct USJFCOM experimentation on emerging, yet untested, concept elements and combinations of elements.

The first prong added an additional 50 source documents from 20 separate agencies to an existing repository of 540 documents. All provided intellectual stimulus directly or indirectly related to the RDO concept. The second prong allowed wider USJFCOM J9 exposure to the Services' already robust experimentation programs aligned toward operationalizing *JV 2010* and later *JV 2020*. The third prong focused on conducting an analytical wargame-driven investigation of independently developed concepts designed around achieving RDO in an upper level small scale contingency in the 2012 timeframe.

THE FINDINGS

So, what did 15 months of leveraging, experimentation, and synthesis tell us about the way to achieve RDO? First and foremost, it *did not* tell us enough to be able to generate and promulgate a 'leather-bound concept' ready for debut and implementation. It *did*, however, give us a much more defined path along which to proceed with concept development and experimentation. As the concept is matured in its development, it will incorporate larger and larger shares of doctrine to get RDO from "think piece" to practice. See Figure 1 on the next page.

Figure 1. Rapid Decisive Operations

A refined definition of RDO emerged from FY 00 and is being used for FY 01 experimentation as follows:

> *"RDO is an operational concept to achieve rapid victory by **attacking the coherence of an enemy's ability to fight**. It is the synchronous application of the **full range of our national capabilities** in timely and direct **effects-based operations**. And, it employs **our asymmetric advantages** in the knowledge, precision, and mobility of the joint force against the enemy's critical functions to create maximum shock to defeat his will and ability to fight."*

There are four complementary and interdependent main elements in the definition.

First, the enemy's ability and will to fight is predicated on numerous factors that have to coherently combine to enable effective combat operations. To create a rapid, decisive conclusion, we propose to "de-synchronize" the enemy's system of systems that enables his national war effort. To identify those key "acupuncture points" among the enemy's systems, we must integrate and expand on the disaggregated understanding of the enemy that already exists among US government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and academia.

Second, RDO planners understand that solutions, like the elements that contribute to greater understanding, are not confined to military-only actions. They will leverage national actions from both within DOD and the rest of the US government to generate desired effects. This will necessitate institutionalized, multi-departmental, collaborative networks and processes.

Third, effects-based operations, much like military planning, start with the end in mind. The end that guides the process is the overall effect(s) that we want to achieve in an operation. This process should not start with, or be biased toward, incapacitation of the adversary as the 'option of choice' to achieve behavior modification. This effect(s) provides the guideline to plan and the yardstick to measure the tactical actions required in the battlespace.

Finally, the United States and its allies have created tremendous asymmetric advantages through improvements in information technology, quality of training, and the ability to adapt other technologies to our way of fighting. Our ability to create shocks to an enemy system and pose unsolvable dilemmas for the enemy comes from rapidly creating and using knowledge to tightly link precision engagement and dominant maneuver capabilities.

Our intent is to break the enemy's willingness to fight. Failing that, it is to maintain the capability to defeat the enemy's ability to fight.

The RDO definition and its explanation highlight that the drafters of *JV 2020* got it right! The key enabler for RDO *is* information superiority when that information superiority is then "translated to superior knowledge and decisions." In other words, knowledge is a key resource and process, and must be managed for successful accomplishment of a RDO. The knowledge of how an enemy's system of systems operates and can be "de-synchronized" is a precursor to RDO. The knowledge we share with our interagency community partners can be collectively used both to take appropriate—and perhaps very discrete—tactical actions to create the desired effects and to achieve early conflict resolution.

BOTTOM LINE

The RDO concept is an experimentation success story. The Joint Experimentation directorate entered the exploration by interpreting the April 2000 *DPG* tasking literally. We then looked for combinations of organization, process, and emerging systems that would enable us to "bring all the capabilities to the fight quicker and make it deadlier once it got there." In experimentation, we were unable to fashion combinations that showed promise in achieving *lasting* advantages over the wide array of adaptive future adversaries. The analytical conclusion is that in the future, the United States cannot rely on introducing decisive 'mass' into the theater of operations as its hedge against uncertainty about what it will find there or be asked to do. The laws of physics, geography, national will, budget, and politics combine to create insurmountable obstacles to the 'overwhelming mass' approach unless the national interests at stake are so compelling that all bets are off.

Since we are unable to compensate for the unknown with mass and are unwilling to accept additional risk when entering the uncertain battlespace, an alternative is required. The RDO team has chosen to treat the element of uncertainty not as a constant that must be overcome by mass, but as a condition that can be eroded, reduced and circumvented by new combinations of organization, processes, and collaborative networking enabled by emerging information-age technologies.

THE ROAD AHEAD

Currently, Joint Forces Experimentation is in the final planning stages of UNIFIED VISION 01, an RDO concept-refinement experiment. Results from this experiment and various small scale joint experimentation events, along with participation in Service and combatant command experimentation, should prepare us for the first joint large-scale field experiment, MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 02. Joint Experimentation will be carefully analyzing data in 25 subject areas to synthesize recommendations for change to doctrine, organization, training, materiel, logistics, personnel, and facilities for tomorrow's warrior.

QUOTABLE QUOTE

"The whole art of war is being transformed into mere prudence, with the primary aim of preventing the uncertain balance from shifting suddenly to our disadvantage and half-war from developing into total war."

Clausewitz
On War, viii, 1832

(This appears to be the earliest appearance of the phrase, "total war.")

DOMINANT MANEUVER: Emerging Operational Concept or Traditional Military Objective?

By LTC Yeong Tae Pak, USA; Maj Kurt Marisa, USAF; Maj Steven Olive, USAF; and LCDR Robert Boyer, USN

[Disclaimer: The original version of this paper was written to partially satisfy the requirements of the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC), Joint and Combined Staff Officers School (JCSOS). This paper was selected as winner of the MacArthur Foundation Award for joint critical analysis/critical campaign analysis in JCSOS Class 01-1 (Intermediate). The contents of this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the JFSC, its Commandant, or Staff.]

INTRODUCTION

Much of what is presented as revolutionary, or evolutionary, in future joint warfare doctrine appears to be primarily reworked traditional principles of war and tenets of operational art. One example is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's (CJCS) *Joint Vision 2010* (*JV 2010*), which evolved into *JV 2020*. *JV 2010* described the attainment of new levels of operational effectiveness, massed effects, and "full spectrum dominance" through employment of synchronized joint forces and the application of four new, emerging operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics. Theoretically, information superiority and technological innovation would transform the traditional functions of maneuver, strike, protection, and logistics into these four "emerging" concepts. In reality, *JV 2010* did not represent innovative, future-based strategic thinking—it has been described as an "illustration of thinking tactically…without evident purpose beyond fighting and winning."[1] *JV 2020* unimaginatively restated *JV 2010* by reemphasizing attainment of full spectrum dominance through the emergence of the same four operational concepts. Although little of *JV 2020* is truly new, visionary, or forward looking; it is still used by the Services as the conceptual template for future military planning, equipping, and training; and the combatant commands cite the four emerging concepts as the overarching future warfighting goal of their respective theater strategies. The recent, ordered reviews of the US military may indicate the new administration believes the US military must truly transform itself to remain relevant. One very recent study found that the military places too much emphasis on sustaining an improved version of today's military, rather than pursuing a true transformation. This study also contended that the current "joint vision" is irrelevant and a future warfare vision (Defense Vision 2025) is needed to give direction to transformation efforts.[2]

DOMINANT MANEUVER: EMERGING OPERATIONAL CONCEPT?

One of the best examples of a traditional US military principle being touted as revolutionary is the presentation of "dominant maneuver" as a new and emerging operational concept. The original, fairly simple definition of **dominant maneuver** in *JV 2010* focused on the joint application of three capabilities (information, engagement, and mobility), but was later modified as:

> **The ability of joint forces to gain positional advantage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo in the achievement of assigned military tasks. Widely dispersed joint air, land, sea, and amphibious, special operations and space forces, capable of scaling and massing force or forces and the effects of fire as required for either combat or noncombat operations, will secure advantage across the range of military operations through the application of information, deception, engagement, mobility and countermobility capabilities.[3]**

A close look at the above definition suggests that "dominant maneuver" is not wholly different than "maneuver," which has been applied in many past conflicts. It would be difficult to argue that the Nazi blitzkrieg operations in WW II were not the pinnacle of dominant maneuver warfare. Going back in US military history, dominant maneuver apparently was used in operations starting with Yorktown and continuing forward through the Battle of Vera Cruz, Chancellorsville, WW II island-hopping, Operation JUST CAUSE, and Operation DESERT STORM.

Possibly the best example of the US military's pursuit of dominant maneuver is Operation CHROMITE—the joint/combined amphibious landing at Inchon, South Korea, along with the Pusan breakout. Detailed analysis of Operation CHROMITE reveals dominant maneuver and its three key capabilities (information superiority, engagement, and mobility) have been part of US military strategy and are not new. US joint vision is actually a confirmation of past military successes, rather than a projection of future US warfighting.

OPERATION CHROMITE

On 25 June 1950, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) surprised the United States and the Republic of South Korea (ROK) by crossing the 38th parallel. On 28 June the NKPA captured Seoul and by 3 July gained control of the port of Inchon. The NKPA engaged in two thrusts, one along the west coast and the second straight south, slowly pushing back US and ROK forces to Pusan.[4] On 12 August 1950, General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief Far East, issued the plan for Operation CHROMITE—a joint/combined amphibious landing at Inchon followed by the liberation of Seoul, disruption of NKPA supply lines, and the breakout of 8th Army from Pusan.[5] Tenth Corps, formed by the 1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry Division, under Major General Edward Almond, spearheaded the assault.

The Inchon landing was a brilliant success. Tenth Corps isolated the landing site, conducted the amphibious assault to secure the Inchon area, and landed follow-on and reserve forces. The landing was preceded and supported by a naval bombardment from Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE) and British ships anchored close offshore. Far East Air Forces (FEAF) bombers flying from Japan also helped isolate the landing area through interdiction attacks against NKPA reinforcements and supply lines. Following the successful Inchon landing, Almond's Tenth Corps and ROK forces rapidly pressed forward. After capturing Seoul, they cut off NKPA lines of communication, and linked up with Lieutenant General Walton Walker's 8th Army forces advancing north after breaking out of the Pusan perimeter.

DOMINANT MANEUVER CAPABILITIES IN OPERATION CHROMITE

Dominant maneuver was the most important concept contributing to the success of this famous joint/combined operation. It was achieved through employment of three key capabilities and attributes of dominant maneuver, information superiority, engagement, and mobility/countermobility.

Information Superiority. Allied forces in Operation CHROMITE achieved relative information superiority through multi-source intelligence and the use of an elaborate deception plan. Attaining information superiority first required good information collection, processing, and analysis.

- Using the available **raw intelligence**, the X Corps G-2 and the other in-theater Service intelligence organizations (i.e., 8th Army, NAVFE, and FEAF) cooperated closely to share information and produce numerous accurate intelligence reports, enemy course of action estimates, and terrain maps/studies.[6] Tenth Corps' intelligence estimate identified an absence of effective NKPA air defense/close air support (CAS) capabilities, an accurate projection of defending NKPA ground troops, and the questionable commitment of reserve forces.[7] The X Corps After-Action Study confirms the US information dominance that existed.[8] By building a robust analytical capability in the X Corps G-2, encouraging joint intelligence cooperation, and conducting effective multidisciplinary collection operations; US forces were able to obtain an accurate estimate of the NKPA situation.

- The new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was primarily responsible for establishing spy networks and agent operations throughout communist-held areas, including North Korea. CIA reporting networks were augmented by activities of the Korea Liaison Office G-2, Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC), [9] and other USAF-led **human intelligence (HUMINT)** operations.[10] In addition, defectors, enemy prisoners of war, and captured documents and materiel were exploited for their intelligence value.[11] However, the single most successful HUMINT mission was Operation TRUDY JACKSON, led by an officer with an intimate knowledge of Asia, the legendary Navy LT Eugene Clark. Clark and his team gathered tidal information at the exact location US Marines would storm ashore and succeeded in repairing an offshore lighthouse lamp, which provided the invasion fleet with a critical navigation marker.[12]

- Both NAVFE and FEAF conducted sustained and dedicated **photo intelligence** of the main roads and towns to determine troop strength, location, and movement; as well as road and bridge condition; and to develop target sets.[13] **Visual reconnaissance** was used for joint force targeting and to monitor enemy troop movements.[14] Finally, national-level and Service organizations increased **signals intelligence** collection and reporting in the Seoul-Inchon and Korea-Russia/China border areas.[15]

- Two weeks before the invasion, General MacArthur's staff began executing an elaborate **military deception** plan hoping NKPA intelligence would conclude the landing would occur at Kunsan, 105 miles south of Inchon. In Tokyo and Pusan, junior officers from Army CIC "disclosed" that a large amphibious force was preparing to attack at Kunsan. Army Special Forces and Royal Marine commandos landed on Kunsan's waterfront. The HMS *Triumph* sailed into Kunsan harbor and

pounded the city and its docks. The FEAF bombed and strafed a 30-mile radius around Kunsan. Marines placed on transport ships in Pusan were briefed over loudspeakers on the Kunsan defenses allowing local dock workers to overhear the "invasion plan." FEAF dropped thousands of leaflets along the coast warning civilians to escape to the interior to avoid the imminent violence. NKPA forces dug in around Kunsan and waited for an invasion that never came.[16] The successful deception operation helped General MacArthur achieve information superiority and demonstrated the criticality of military deception to dominant maneuver.

Engagement, as part of dominant maneuver, requires the operational art principles of synchronized employment of joint/combined forces and the synergistic effects of joint fires.

- **Synchronized Employment of Joint/Combined Forces**. The [Operation CHROMITE] plan required tight coordination between naval surface and air fires.[17] NAVFE provided two days of preparation bombardment on Wolmi-do island and the areas around Inchon. The 5th Air Force provided general air support for the invasion by isolating the objective area, giving air-to-ground support to the 8th Army in the south, and executing an on-order airdrop of the airborne troops. Navy, Marine Corps, and British air units all provided CAS.[18] The invasion itself consisted of two separate landings. The first assault during the morning tide was on Wolmi-do by a 1st Marine Division battalion with tanks and support engineers. The main landing at Inchon, by two Marine regiments with a regiment of the Korean Marine Corps in reserve, took place on the evening high tide, 11 hours later.[19] After mopping-up operations around Inchon, the Marine force advanced and seized Kimpo Airport, crossed the Han River, occupied Seoul, and then set up blocking positions in an arc above Seoul. The 7th Infantry Division of X Corps followed the Marines ashore, advancing on their southern flank, and wheeled north into Seoul. The X Corps then linked up with the 8th Army advancing from the south out of Pusan. Per *JV 2020*, the synchronized employment of dispersed forces allowed the joint force commander (General MacArthur) to establish control of the battlespace at the proper time and place.

- **Effects of Joint Operational Fires**. The effective and coordinated use of joint operational fires was vital to the success of the Inchon landing and follow-on operations. On the morning of 15 September, as the invasion armada worked its way into the Inchon approaches, the final bombardment began with four cruisers, three rocket ships, and six destroyers that maneuvered to within 800 yards of Wolmi-do.[20] As

the lead elements of the 1st Marine Division made the initial assault on Wolmi-do, their approach was covered by the rocket ships within a few hundred yards of the shore. As the Marines came ashore, their advance was covered by CAS, which strafed just 50 yards to their front.[21] As the tides returned in the late afternoon, the second landing began, supported by another naval bombardment. FEAF CAS attacks also continued until the landing craft were within 30 yards of their landing locations. The aircraft then continued inland to interdict reinforcement convoys. By the end of the night, General MacArthur's big gamble was a success. The X Corps was ashore and prepared to continue the attack east to seize Seoul and the lines of supply and communication.[22] The effects of joint operational fires continued to play a key role through the capture of Seoul and link-up with the 8th Army. The day after landing, the 1st Marine Division advanced out of Inchon. Navy and Marine aircraft supported the Marine advance, attacking NKPA reinforcements along the Seoul-Inchon highway.[23]

By using synchronized forces and the effects of joint operational fires to maximize engagement, Operation CHROMITE epitomized the "ability to attain the positional advantage [that] allows the commander to employ decisive combat power that will compel an adversary to react from a position of disadvantage, or quit."[24]

Mobility/Countermobility is the third key capability necessary for dominant maneuver. General MacArthur and his subordinate commanders used mobility to position and employ widely dispersed joint forces to accomplish a mission thought by many to be impossible. This successful use of mobility is best studied in the context of the operational and logistical challenges General MacArthur confronted.

- **Physical Challenges**. Inchon had extremely high tides, averaging 27 feet and sometimes reaching 36 feet. The mud banks created by these tides were ideal for minefields and a nightmare for navigation. Compounding this problem, high tides were very brief; therefore, the timing and speed of the landing was critical.[25] Inchon was "the worst possible place we could bring in an amphibious assault."[26] The difficult physical challenges faced by the US/ROK forces were also clear to the NKPA, thus contributing to MacArthur's ability to attain complete surprise.

- **Military Challenges**. First, there was insufficient time for preparations or rehearsals due to the incessant NKPA assaults on Pusan. With D-day set for 15 September, the final operation had to be planned and executed in less than a month—normally an operation this size would take at least 160 days. However, a delay that long could have meant

defeat.[27] Second, insufficient forces were in-theater to mount an operation of that scale. However; through a major reserve call-up, ROK augmentation, and troop transfers from other theaters; X Corps was fully manned and equipped by the time of the landings.[28] A third military challenge was managing external versus internal lines of communication and supply. Although the NKPA initially controlled internal lines of communications, allied forces controlled external lines of communications through the use of force mobility and naval and air power. That allowed allied forces to overcome the "tyranny of distance" and quickly bring the forces and logistical package needed to execute such a difficult amphibious operation.[29] The last military challenge involved selecting the landing location. In choosing Inchon, despite the many contrary arguments, General MacArthur stated: "The history of war proves that nine out of ten times an army has been destroyed because its supply lines have been cut off . . . We shall land at Inchon, I shall crush them."[30]

- **Political Challenges** US leaders were concerned about US actions that could trigger direct Chinese involvement or provoke Russia in Europe, US casualties, and public reaction if the operation failed. However, General MacArthur knew that landing at Inchon and moving quickly to recapture Seoul, then a key enemy center of gravity, would have a huge positive political impact.

In Operation CHROMITE, allied forces used mobility to seize the initiative, place sufficient joint/combined forces, and launch an overwhelming, synchronized assault that swept the NKPA from the peninsula. The results embodied the concept of dominant maneuver.

CONCLUSION

As evidenced by this case study of Operation CHROMITE, dominant maneuver is not a new, emerging operational concept. The historic events of Operation CHROMITE appear to define dominant maneuver: the application of information, deception, engagement, and mobility/countermobility capabilities to enable widely-dispersed joint forces to gain positional advantage with decisive speed, overwhelming operational tempo in the achievement of assigned military tasks, scaling and massing of forces, and maximized effects of joint fires. One of the initial acts of the new National Command Authorities has been to direct a top-down review of the military. It is expected to emphasize real military transformation. This effort, along with the current experimentation efforts by US Joint Forces Command regarding "rapid decisive operations" as the future joint operations concept, and the proposed publication of a *JV 2025* hopefully would represent a true evolutionary and revolutionary warfighting vision.

ENDNOTES

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[4] *Joint Military Operations Historical Collection* (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1997), II-1 to II-5.

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[12] William B. Breuer, *Shadow Warriors, The Covert War in Korea* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1996), 72.

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[22] Ibid, 218.

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[28] *Joint Military Operations Historical Collection* (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1997), II-7 to II-8.

[29] Ibid, II-11 to II-15.

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26TH

SEMIANNUAL

JOINT DOCTRINE

WORKING PARTY

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18-19 October 2000

Col Bob Hinger, Chief of the Doctrine Division from USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) and CAPT Bruce Russell, Chief of the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Division (JDETD), Joint Staff (JS) J7, welcomed the attendees; which included representatives from each of the Services, combatant commands, and JS directorates.

MajGen Osman, JS J7, provided opening remarks that emphasized the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff genuinely believes doctrine is urgent business and is "the engine of change." He added that the Chairman is more than willing to resolve tough doctrine issues.

Lt Col Shelby Ball from JS J7/JDETD provided a joint doctrine update. He explained that the **new shortened doctrine development timeline is now 21 months**. It eliminates the need for preliminary coordination, incorporates publication preparation time and early O-6 involvement, and requires oversight improvements like strict adherence to milestones and automatic tracking.

LTC Rick Steinke of USJFCOM JWFC explained the **new assessment process**. During the 18-24 month window after publication, USJFCOM JWFC Doctrine Division will conduct an internal [preliminary] assessment to determine if the publication should receive a formal interim [an early final] assessment. If the decision is NO, then a message will be released announcing the decision with accompanying rationale and findings. If the decision is YES, then a [request for feedback message will follow].

DECISION BRIEFS

Maj Brian Anderson from USSPACECOM J5X proposed development of "JTTP for Space Control." Lt Col Nate Toth from USJFCOM JWFC provided the front-end analysis, which concluded that it is premature to develop joint doctrine or JTTP on space control. **The JDWP voted 8-7 to develop *JTTP for Space Control*— EUCOM, JFCOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM, USN, USMC, and CENTCOM voted against**.

MAJ Woolwine from the JS J2 proposed "fast-tracking" JP 2-01, *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations*. **The JDWP voted 12-2 to not "fast-track" JP 2-01** (CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM voted for), **but voted 12-0 to proceed with an early revision**— USAF and EUCOM abstained.

COL Steinke proposed having USJFCOM JWFC produce all revision first drafts (RFDs). **The JDWP voted unanimously to have USJFCOM JWFC and the LA co-chair the development of all JP RFDs with the LA retaining overall control during the development of all drafts until control is passed to the JSDS**.

CDR Sally deGozzaldi from JS J7/JDETD provided three possible courses of action for transitioning to paperless publications. **The JDWP voted unanimously to stop printing in 2002 except for capstone/keystone publications**.

CWO4 Mike Hart from USCG proposed reverting to the original JP 3-50 series hierarchy by including search and rescue publications. **The JDWP voted 12-2 against** (SPACECOM and USCG voted for) **adopting the proposed personnel recovery hierarchy numbering**. Later, per executive session discussions, **CAPT Russell amended the decision by deferring any action until DOD's personnel recovery policy is articulated officially.**

INFORMATION BRIEFS

Col Hinger described the "Doctrine Tool Kit." He announced that this JDWP is going to take a close look at the joint doctrine hierarchy to see how it can be modified to make it more pertinent and useful.

CDR Jim Woodard discussed the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center. He explained that ALSA's mission is to "rapidly and responsively develop multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures, facilitating joint information exchange and operational solutions across the entire military spectrum...*meeting the immediate needs of the warfighter*."

COL (Ret) Hank Hodge from the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense on Gulf War Illnesses (OSAGWI)/Medical Readiness (MR)/Military Deployments (MD) discussed medical readiness and military deployments.

Col Larry McNew from the Joint Cruise Missile Defense Joint Test Force (JCMD JTF) noted that one of the JCMD JTF products will be a CMD Warfighter Handbook for the combatant commanders. Lt Col Steve Smith from JS J7/JDETD announced that a prototype Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System (JDEIS) will be

JOINT PUBLICATION STATUS

APPROVED SINCE OCTOBER 1, 2000

PUB#	TITLE
1 Rev1	Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
3-57	Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations

IN REVISION OVER THE NEXT 6 MONTHS

PUB#	TITLE
1-05 Rev1**	Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations
2-01 Rev1	Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations
3-07.1 Rev1	JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
3-09.3 Rev1	JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)
3-10 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations
3-10.1 Rev1	JTTP for Base Defense
3-12 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations
3-12.2 Rev1	Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data
3-12.3 Rev1	Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data (Notional)
3-13 Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for Information Operations
3-13.1 Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)
3-50.2 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue
3-52 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
3-53 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations
3-55 Rev1	Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Support for Joint Operations
3-55.1 Rev1	JTTP for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
3-56.1 Rev1	Command and Control for Joint Air Operations
3-58 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Military Deception
3-61 Rev1**	Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations
4-01 Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System
4-01.3 Rev1**	JTTP for Movement Control
4-01.6 Rev1**	JTTP for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS)
4-03 Rev1	Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine
4-05 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning
5-0 Rev1	Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
6-0 Rev1	Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations
6-02 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems

SCHEDULED FOR APPROVAL OVER THE NEXT 6 MONTHS

PUB#	TITLE
0-2 Rev2	Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
1-02	DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
1-04	JTTP for Legal Support to Military Operations
2-01.2 Rev1	Joint Doctrine and TTP for Counterintelligence Support to Operations
3-0 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Operations
3-02 Rev1^{FT}	Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
3-05.1	JTTP for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations
3-07.6	JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
3-14	Joint Doctrine for Space Operations
3-17 Rev1**	Joint Doctrine and JTTP for Air Mobility Operations
3-18	Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations
3-60	Joint Doctrine for Targeting
4-01.5 Rev1	JTTP for Terminal Operations
4-02 Rev1**	Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations
4-04 Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support
4-07	JTTP for Common-User Logistics During Joint Operations
-------Rev2	Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer

UNDER ASSESSMENT

PUB#	TITLE
3-01	Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats
3-02.2*	Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation
3-07*	Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
3-07.1*	JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
3-33	Joint Force Capabilities
3-35	Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations
3-50.3*	Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery
3-53*	Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations
3-58*	Joint Doctrine for Military Deception
4-06*	JTTP for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations

UNDER EVALUATION

PUB#	TITLE
4-08	Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations

WITHIN 12 MONTH ASSESSMENT WINDOW

PUB#	TITLE	PUB#	TITLE
1-06	JTTP for Financial Management During Joint Operations	3-34	Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations
2-0	Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations	3-51	Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare
2-01.3	JTTP for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace	3-54*	Joint Doctrine for Operations Security
3-01.1*	Aerospace Defense of North America	4-0	Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations
3-03*	Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations	4-01.2*	JTTP for Sealift Support to Joint Operations
3-07.5*	JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations	4-01.4	JTTP for Joint Theater Distribution
3-08*	Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations	4-01.7*	JTTP for Use of Intermodal Containers in Joint Operations
3-11	Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments	4-01.8	JTTP for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
3-16	Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations	4-02.2*	JTTP for Patient Movement in Joint Operations

* Denotes final assessment, all others are preliminary assessments   ** Denotes early revision ^{FT} Denotes "fast track"

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|	username	phone#
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JOINT DOCTRINE HIERARCHY
"As of 12 April 2001"

Future Concepts of Joint Warfare

DOCTRINE

SUPPORTING DOCTRINE & JTTP

Top Hierarchy

- Joint Warfare 1
- UNAAF 0-2 #
  - Capstone/ Keystone Primer
  - Joint Personnel 1-0
  - Joint Intelligence 2-0
  - Joint Operations 3-0 #
    - Military Ops Other than War 3-07
    - Joint Interagency Coordination 3-08 (Vols I & II)
    - Joint Multinational Operations 3-16
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Joint Personnel & Administration
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- Health Logistics 4-02.1
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Joint Planning
- Campaign Planning 5-00.1
- JTF Planning 5-00.2
- Petroleum 4-03 #
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114 Publications

- ■ Approved pubs
- ■ # Approved pubs being changed/revised
- ▨ Pubs under development
- ☐ Pubs to be developed

DOCTRINE ORGANIZATION UPDATES

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By CAPT Bruce Russell, USN, Division Chief

Branch Move. The Joint Doctrine Branch is scheduled to move to its new location near the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization in the Pentagon during September 2001. Stay tuned for more information on this matter.

Personnel Turnover. The Joint Doctrine Branch will be saying farewell to doctrine stalwart, Lt Col Steve Smith, who is completing his Joint Staff (JS) tour and is selected to attend Air War College at Maxwell AFB in Montgomery, Alabama this Summer. In addition, the cornerstone of the JDETD Administrative Section, Chief Royce Jones, will retire and go ashore for the last time in May 2001—fair winds and following seas Chief. God bless and best wishes to both as they travel new roads. The Joint Doctrine Branch recently welcomed CDR Ed Lemley, who is assigned to us for six months active duty for special work as a Reservist coming from the Naval Reserve Security Group. He will be handling special projects. Also, our newest doctrine developer, LTC Lawrence "Rucker" Snead arrived after heading up the Inauguration Committee. LTC Snead has an extensive background in land warfare.

Publications of Interest

- Two joint publications; JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, 14 November 2000 and JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, 8 February 2001; have been approved since the last newsletter. Congratulations to all for the hard work and effort required for the coordination and approval process to be successful.

- Two publications of high interest are expected to be approved this Summer. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, is scheduled for approval in June 2001 and JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, is scheduled for approval in July 2001.

- JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, should be approved around the time of this printing.

- The February 2001 version of the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) is being reproduced and will soon be distributed. The JEL is made available through the Chairman's Joint Doctrine Internet site and on CD-ROM. It contains over 10,000 digital files, including all approved joint doctrine publications, CJCS Instructions and Manuals, key Service publications, and a host of other reference documents. The JEL on the Internet is among the most popular and often-used Internet resources in the Department of Defense with over six million visitors per year.

Paperless Joint Publications. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved our recommendation to stop printing joint publications, except for capstone and keystone publications, in the 6x9 paper format. Beginning on October 1, 2001, joint publications (except for capstones and keystones) will be distributed only electronically through the JEL on the Internet and CD-ROM.

Joint Doctrine Development Policy. The relatively new joint doctrine development policy requiring strict adherence to development milestones and early resolution of contentious issues has proven successful. A planner level meeting with combatant command, Joint Staff Directorate, and Service representation resolved the contentious issues in JP 1-01, *Joint Doctrine Development System*, so it could remain on schedule and be approved in July 2000. Further, the contentious issues in JP 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, and JP 3-18, *Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry*, have been resolved using the policy. Consequently, their milestones were reset and the publications continue development.

NATO English Speaking Nations (ESN) Terminology Conference. The ESN Conference is hosted every third year, on an alternating basis, by one of three nations; the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The ESN Conference is part of the annual series of NATO terminology conferences under the NATO Standardization Agency. The purpose of the series is standardization of civil and military terminology in both English and French for use throughout NATO; plus development and review of the required plans, policy, and procedures for implementation. These conferences are a principal feature of the NATO Standardization Program. This year's NATO ESN Conference, hosted by JS J7 in Arlington, VA, took place from 19 to 23 March 2001. Mr. Nicholas Fleischmann from JDETD served as head of the US delegation, which also included delegates from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Major General H. P. Osman, USMC, J-7 Director, gave a welcoming speech on the opening day. Terminology that was approved at the ESN Conference will be considered for final NATO approval in follow-up meetings at NATO Headquarters. "NATO-agreed" terminology is incorporated in **AAP-6,** *NATO Glossary of Terms and*

Definitions (English and French). Where applicable, the "NATO-agreed" terminology will be considered for possible use within DOD and subsequent inclusion in JP 1-02.

JDETD's World Wide Web (WWW) Page. Work has begun on the new JDETD WWW page, which will link visitors to the JEL and other education and training websites. It is being designed to enable quicker access to the JEL and related sites. The first version was provided for review on 13 March 2001 by OC, Incorporated. They are incorporating recommendations from that meeting. Once the revision is complete (TBD); OC, Incorporated will provide it for a second review.

JOINT AND ARMY DOCTRINE DIRECTORATE (JADD), HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (HQ, TRADOC)

By COL Mark E. Warner, USA, Director

Before providing our update, I would like to acknowledge the passing of Mr. Louis J. Napoleon on 31 March 2001. Lou, a GS-15, served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine here at TRADOC from January 1993 until his death. Many of you are aware of Lou's long and distinguished service to the joint doctrine development community—he will be truly missed.

TRADOC Five Year Doctrine Master Plan. The JADD Policy Team is updating the TRADOC Five Year Doctrine Master Plan. The current Plan encompasses FYs 01-05 and was approved in June 2000 by the TRADOC Doctrine Development Board. The update will cover plans for FYs 02-06. The Doctrine Master Plan had its genesis as a recommendation from the 00/01 Doctrine Study conducted by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine during the Summer of 2000. It was developed primarily as a planning tool for managing and resourcing doctrine development. The Doctrine Master Plan incorporates all TRADOC proponent plus Army Medical Department, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, and Army War College workload; captures digital doctrine development efforts; clearly delineates doctrine development priorities; and leverages the installation contract process instituted by the TRADOC Commander. It attempts to solidify doctrine development out to two fiscal years. Planning beyond this is based upon a five-year revision cycle for doctrine. The Doctrine Master Plan doubles as a doctrine tracking system and a primary database that is capable of manipulation—the administrator can sort several bits of doctrine development information to include milestones for the rescission and

consolidation of publications. Our goal is to have the Doctrine Master Plan staffing completed by mid-May 2001 for presentation to the June 2001 Doctrine Development Board. Our POC is LTC Steve Wallace at DSN 680-2778 or e-mail: *wallaces@monroe.army.mil*.

TRADOC Regulation 25-36, *The TRADOC Doctrinal Literature Program*, dated 5 April 2000, is being revised to incorporate modified or new doctrine development policy as a result of the findings/ recommendations of TRADOC's FY 00 Doctrine Study. This regulation prescribes policy for TRADOC and non-TRADOC doctrine agencies in the development of Army, multi-Service, and multinational doctrine. It defines responsibilities for the management, development, staffing, review, approval, production, and dissemination of doctrinal literature. Our POC is Mr. Lawrence Washington at DSN 680-3454 or e-mail: *washingl@monroe.army.mil*.

Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) Doctrine

- The Army and Marine Corps have developed a JFLCC Handbook that focuses on joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for command and control of joint force land operations. Comments from the Services, USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center, and others were incorporated. Approval and distribution of the handbook took place in March 2001. The handbook is on the JADD website and the JEL.

- The approved program directive for JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Forces*, was published in March 2001. The next working group will convene by May 2001. The first draft will be staffed by mid-July 2001. Our POC is MAJ Ken Bowman at DSN 680-3892 or e-mail: *bowmank@ monroe.army.mil*.

JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*. The preliminary coordination version was forwarded by JADD to the lead agent, HQDA, on 2 February 2001. The writing team wishes to recognizes the contributions of the joint doctrine development community for their assistance in this project. In particular, we would like to give special recognition to LTC Jim Boling and Professor Milan Vego from the Naval War College for their contributions. Our POC is Mr. Steve Senkovich at DSN 680-2965 or e-mail: *senkovichs@monroe.army.mil*.

NATO and Multinational Doctrine. JADD recently hired Mr. Gary May to work NATO and multinational doctrine issues. Mr. May will track, manage, and coordinate reviews of all NATO; American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies; and other multinational land force and joint doctrine with proponent schools and centers. He will work closely with the DCSDOC

International Army Programs Directorate in the ratification of International Standard Agreements, and participate in Service working groups under the auspices of the NATO Standardization Agency. Recent actions include the review of the ratification drafts of the NATO capstone document AJP 01(B), *Allied Joint Doctrine*, and the keystone document AJP 3-0, *Allied Joint Operations*. Recent efforts include participation in the Tactical Land Forces Operations Doctrine Working Group from 9-13 April 2001 that addressed the development of key publications such as AJP-3.2, *Land Forces Tactical Doctrine*; AJP-3.4.1, *Peace Support Operations*; and STANAG 2467, *Standing Operating Procedures*. Mr. May also attended the Air Operations Working Group from 23-27 April 2001 that addressed development of the following key publications: AJP-3.3, *Air Operations*; AJP-3.3.7, *Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) Doctrine*; and STANAG 3805/ATP-40(B), *Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War*. A primary goal in NATO and multinational doctrine is making drafts publications more accessible to proponent schools and centers. To that end, JADD has loaded several of the draft AJPs on its website, *http://doctrine.army.mil*, under NATO. The plan is to expand this site as more draft publications become available, and eventually, include all NATO and multinational doctrine. Our POC, Mr. May, can be reached at DSN 680-3439, or e-mail: *mayga@monroe.army.mil*.

KEY ARMY PUBLICATIONS STATUS

FM 1 (100-1), *The Army*, is currently with the Army Chief of Staff for final review/comment. Note that no other manuals will be published until this one is approved; therefore, all publication dates listed below are estimates only.

FM 1-02 (101-5-1), *Operational Terms and Graphics*, will be released in the third quarter of 2001 for staffing. Publication of this manual is TBD.

FM 3-0 (100-5), *Operations (Doctrine Review and Approval Group [DRAG] Edition)*, is currently waiting publication of FM 1 and DRAG approval.

FM 3-07 (100-20), *Stability Operations and Support Operations (Coordinating Draft)*, was released for staffing in March 2001.

FM 3-13 (100-6), *Information Operations (Final Draft)*, has been released for review. The DRAG version will be released in June 2001 and publication is scheduled for September 2001.

FM 3-100.40 (100-40), *Tactics (DRAG Edition)*, is available on the Internet for review. Expect publication in August 2001.

FM 3-50 (100-7), *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations (First Draft)*, review is complete. The second draft staffing date is TBD. The scope has been expanded from the previous version to include discussion currently found in FM 3-100.16 (100-16), *Army Operational Support*, and to include discussion on JFLCC operations. This revision of FM 3-50 (100-7) is intended to clarify the roles of Army Forces (ARFOR) and incorporates ARFOR lessons learned from recent operations in Kuwait, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

FM 3-100.71 (71-100), *Division Operations (Final Draft)*, was recently released for review.

FM 3-100.1 (100-15), *Corps Operations*, is on hold pending Corps design analysis work.

FM 4-0 (100-10), *Combat Service Support (Final Draft)*, was staffed in January 2001.

FM 5-0 (101-5), *Army Planning and Orders Production (First Draft)*, was distributed for comment on 15 February 2001.

FM 6-0 (100-34), *Command and Control (DRAG Edition)*, was published in March 2001.

Questions about Army manuals should be referred to LTC Reggie Mason at DSN 680-3560 or e-mail: *masonrp@monroe.army.mil*.

NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND (NWDC)

By Mr. Jim Gabor

WEB-ENABLED DOCTRINE

NWDC is continuing its innovative approach to the creation, use, and maintenance of Navy doctrine. The NWDC SIPRNET site now provides online access to draft and approved doctrine through a secure, web-enabled front-end. Fleet users may view publications, recommend changes, view other user inputs, share comments, and interact with the publication's author.

The website offers access to approved and draft Navy (Navy doctrine publications, naval warfare publications, Navy TTP, multi-Service TTP, FXP), joint, and a growing number of unclassified allied publications. It is built around a threaded discussion group model and requires no special software (users need only their browser and Acrobat Reader). Each publication has its own discussion group. The primary goals of this initiative are to:

- Place the tools needed to keep doctrine current and relevant in the hands of Fleet operators.

- Significantly shorten the adjudication process for recommended change inputs.

- Remove administrative impediments to affecting change.

- Encourage engagement in the process through ongoing dialog, collaboration, and feedback.

- Eliminate arbitrary revision timelines through continuous online improvement.

All comments posted to the site are universally visible to facilitate and encourage Fleet-wide collaboration. Participants characterize comments as critical, major, substantive, or administrative; and must delineate whether comments are "individual" or "command" input. There also is an optional "subscription" feature for each publication/ discussion group. Once selected, the system automatically notifies the user via e-mail when new inputs are posted. Over time, use of this feature will build a "community of practice" for each publication.

More process improvements are envisioned. This new system is a first step in fully achieving a web-enabled system for developing and maintaining relevant doctrine. The site can be accessed at *www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil*. Select the link "Publications Change Submittal/Doctrine Discussion Groups" which will take you to the opening page. The opening page also can be accessed directly at *http://www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil/doctrinehome/ DocumentDev/DEFAULT.CFM.*

HEADQUARTERS, AIR FORCE DOCTRINE CENTER (HQ, AFDC)

By Lt Col John P. Klatt, USAF, HQ AFDC/DJ

HQ AFDC's Joint Integration Directorate (AFDC/ DJ) welcomed two new officers to the team. Maj Dale Bruner (Intelligence Branch) came from Shaw AFB where he served as Commander, Systems Flight, 609th Air Intelligence Squadron, 9th Air Force/USCENTAF. Lt Col John P. Klatt, transferred from Maxwell AFB where he served as an academic instructor and advisor and Deputy Chairman of Evaluations at Air Command and Staff College and assumed responsibilities for the Space and Missile Branch. AFDC/DJ also welcomes our new individual mobilization augmentee, Maj Doug Tayrien. Our sole personnel loss since the last edition of this newsletter was significant—our deputy director, Lt Col Marcel "Badger" Schmidt, moved to Luke AFB as an F-16 squadron operations officer. Lt Col Craig S. McLane, formerly in charge of our Combat Operations Division, is our new deputy director.

The following paragraphs reflect the latest status of joint publications for which the Air Force is either the lead agent or primary review authority:

- **JP 3-01.2**, ***Joint Doctrine for Offensive Operations for Countering Air and Missile Threats (First Draft)*** was released on 12 February 2001 for worldwide review and comment.

- **JP 3-30** will replace **JP 3-56.1,** ***Command and Control for Joint Air Operations***. The April 2000 Joint Doctrine Working Party voted to renumber JP 3-56.1 upon revision, since it was orphaned by the cancelled JP 3-56, *Joint Doctrine for Command and Control*, project. JP 3-56.1 will remain in effect until JP 3-30 is published. The JP 3-30 program directive (PD) was published and followed by release of the revision first draft in March 2001 for worldwide review.

- **JP 3-52,** ***Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone***, completed its final assessment by USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) in May 2000 and it was determined that the publication will enter the scheduled revision cycle. Final coordination of the PD was accomplished in March 2001 and release of the revision first draft should occur in September 2001.

- **JP 3-55,** ***Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Target Acquisition (TA) (First Draft)***, was distributed worldwide for comment in February 2000. Comments were due in April 2001 and will be followed by a joint working group to be scheduled between the suspense and mid-June 2001. The second draft, incorporating the joint working group comments, is scheduled for release in mid-August 2001.

- **JP 3-55.1,** ***JTTP for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles*** is being recommended by AFDC and JWFC for cancellation and removal from the joint doctrine hierarchy. Justification for the recommendation questions the need for doctrine on specific systems. Relevant information will be incorporated into JP 3-55 or other joint publications as appropriate.

- **JP 3-60,** ***Joint Doctrine for Targeting***. A joint working group was held recently to resolve outstanding issues that resulted from comments on the preliminary coordination version. The final coordination version was released in April 2001 for worldwide review and comment and, pending any further contention, will be forward to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval in July 2001.

There are a total of 29 approved Air Force Doctrine Documents (AFDDs). Four more are in the final stages of initial development. All of these documents (along with other approved AFDDs) are available on our Internet website at *http://www.doctrine.af.mil* (and on the SIPRNET at *http://www.doctrine.af.smil.mil*).

MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND (MCCDC), DOCTRINE DIVISION, JOINT BRANCH

By Lt Col M. Triplett, USMC

The US Marine Corps is presently monitoring the progress of several joint publications.

- We have been actively assisting the US Navy on the revision of JP 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*. Resolution of the command relationship issue also will further the development of JP 3-18, *Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations*.

- We are working closely with the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command to produce the signature draft of the *Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) Handbook*, and the draft program directive (PD) for JP 3-31, *Joint Doctrine for Joint Force Land Component Commander*.

The US Marine Corps also is in various stages of developing/revising four of the five joint publications for which we are the lead agent.

- Second draft comments on JP 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations*, were incorporated, as appropriate, and the preliminary coordination version was submitted recently to Joint Staff J7 for distribution and worldwide review.

- The PD for JP 3-02.1 *Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations*, is being revised and is expected to be approved soon.

- The Marine Corps coordinated with USJFCOM JWFC regarding the JP 3-02.2, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation* request for feedback message, which was released in March 2001.

- The PD for JP 3-09.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)*, has been revised per comments from the joint doctrine development community.

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (TCJ5-SR)

By Mr. Kenneth E. Collins

Personnel. Our doctrine shop is finally settling in after significant turnover last summer. We have one new addition, Maj Hoang Nguyen, a communications officer coming over from another TRANSCOM J5 team. We also will be saying farewell to LCol Jocelyn Cousineau (Canadian Armed Forces). His outstanding contributions in the allied joint publications arena will be missed. Replacing him will be LCol J. P. Pichette (Canadian Armed Forces), who is arriving in July 2001. The steady hand in the office, Mr. Ken Collins, is starting his last year before retirement.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS UPDATE

JP 3-17, *Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Mobility Operations*, just completed final coordination. Although there were some critical concerns with the transfer of tactical control between combatant commanders, they have been addressed and are being worked out via non-doctrine channels. New subjects addressed in this publication are "air refueling," an end-to-end perspective of air mobility, and the latest information on the Global Transportation Network and "in-transit visibility."

A **JP 4-01,** *Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System (Revision First Draft)*, joint doctrine working group was held from 6-9 March 2001 to address some critical and major concerns regarding Appendix A, "Transportation Priorities." All concerns and issues have been addressed and the preliminary coordination version will be released for review by late April 2001. Joint Staff J4 is the lead agent/Joint Staff doctrine sponsor and we are the PRA with TRANSCOM's Joint Deployment Training Center doing the writing.

AIR LAND SEA APPLICATION (ALSA) CENTER

By COL Mark Zodda, USA, Director

We remain busy here at the ALSA Center. Our primary effort over the last six months has been to continue to clear the backlog of ongoing projects, however we continue to conduct research on potential new products and assess our existing publications for possible revision. You can expect ALSA's CY 2001 output to include several revisions and new projects.

The publications we produce are on a three-year assessment cycle. Since we have had a large number of assessments in the past few years, I thought it was important to explain the purpose of ALSA and what our publications do for the Services. According to the memorandum of agreement between the Services, "the ALSA Center provides a four-Service approach to responsively and rapidly develop multi-Service concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) across the entire scope of military operations. ALSA will develop and publish selected TTP publications, studies, and periodicals that coordinate service doctrine and complement efforts of government, joint, unified, and Service staff, and provide solutions that cross Service lines to meet **immediate** needs of operating forces." Within this framework, our publications do the following:

- Provide a bridge between joint and Service doctrine (e.g., Explosive Ordnance Disposal).

- Capture multi-Service solutions to joint operations problems (e.g., Joint Air Operations Center and the Army Air and Missile Defense Command Coordination).

- Establish a foundation for joint doctrine (e.g., Humanitarian Assistance).

- Provide a blueprint (80%) to the field when Services can't agree on doctrine (100%) (e.g., Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control).

The following are lists of current (as of March 2001) publications, new projects, and publications under revision. For the most up-to-date information, go to our website at *www.dtic.mil/alsa*. Lt Col R. G. McManus has done excellent work updating our site to insure that you, the warfighters, have access to our approved publications, drafts, and up-to-date information on ongoing projects.

CURRENT ALSA PUBLICATIONS	
TITLE--DATE	**POC**
Aviation Operations on Urban Terrain--**APR 01**	**Team B**
BMO: *Bomber Maritime Operations* (SECRET)--**JUN 00**	**Team E**
EOD: *Multi-Service Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a Joint Environment*--**MAR 01**	**Team D**
ICAC2: *Multi-Service Procedures for Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control*--**JUN 00**	**Team D**
***JAAT:** *Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Attack Team Operations*--**JUN 98**	**Team F**
JAOC/AAMDC Coordination: *MTTP for Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) and Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) Coordination*--**JAN 01**	**Team F**
JATC: *Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Traffic Control*--**JAN 99**	**Team D**
JIADS: *Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Integrated Air Defense System*--**MAR 01**	**Team A**
***J-PROWLER:** *MTTP for EA-6B Employment in a Joint Environment* (SECRET)--**JUL 97**	**Team E**
J-SEAD: *MTTP for the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses* (SECRET)--**SEP 00**	**Team A**
J-STARS: *MTTP for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System* (SECRET)--**JUL 97**	**Team G**
JTF IM: *Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Task Force Information Management*--**APR 99**	**Team B**
***JTF LIAISON HANDBOOK:** *MTTP for Joint Task Force (JTF) Liaison Operations*--**AUG 98**	**Team E**
JTMTD: *Joint Theater Missile Target Development*--**OCT 99**	**Team F**
MTTP for NBC Defense of Theater Fixed Sites, Ports, and Airfields--**AUG 00**	**Team E**
***NLW:** *MTTP for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons*--**OCT 98**	**Team D**
RECCE-J: *Multi-Service Procedures for Requesting Reconnaissance Information in a Joint Environment*--**JUN 96**	**Team E**
***REPROGRAMMING:** *Handbook for Reprogramming of Electronic Warfare and Target Sensing Systems* (Distribution Restricted)--**APR 98**	**Team G**
RM: *MTTP for Risk Management*--**MAR 01**	**Team C**
SURVIVAL, EVASION, AND RECOVERY: *Multi-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery*--**JUN 99**	**Team B**
TADIL-J: *Introduction to Tactical Digital Information Link J and Quick Reference Guide*--**JUN 00**	**Team G**
***TAGS:** *Multi-Service Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System*--**JUL 98**	**Team F**
***TARGETING:** *The Joint Targeting Process and Procedures for Targeting Time-Critical Targets*--**JUL 97**	**Team B**
TMD IPB: *Multi-Service Procedures for Theater Missile Defense and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*--**JAN 01**	**Team G**
* **Three-year assessment, ALSA, through combatant commands and Services, recommends to retain, revise, or rescind.**	

NEW PROJECTS

TITLE	EST PUB DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION AND STATUS
AMCI (Revision): *Army and Marine Corps Integration in Joint Operations*	May 01	A: FM 3-97.31 M: MCRP 3-3.8 N: N/A AF: N/A	Describes the capabilities and limitations of selected Army and Marine Corps organizations and provides TTP for the integrated employment of these units in joint operations. Signature draft is being prepared. **POC: Team C**
ARM-J (Revision): *Antiradiation Missile Employment in a Joint Environment*	Aug 01	A: FM 2-00.2 M: MCRP 3-22.1 N: NTTP 3-01.41 AF: AFTTP (I) 3-2.11	This revision of the Jun 95 manual will provide multi-Service procedures for antiradiation missile employment in a joint or multinational environment, with an emphasis on fratricide prevention. The scope will expand to include SECRET information. The first draft is out for comment. **POC: Team A**
BREVITY (Revision): *Multi-Service Air-Air, Air-Surface, Surface-Air Brevity Codes*	Jun 01	A: FM 3-97.18 M: MCRP 3-25B N: NWP 6-02.1 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.5	This publication will remain a pocket-size dictionary of joint use brevity codes to augment JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, and to expedite joint and coalition communications during combat. All comments have been received on first draft. Preparing final coordination draft **POC: Team F**
IDM *(Improved Data Modem)*	Mar 02	A: Pending M: Pending N: Pending AF: Pending	The scope of this publication is still being defined. Continuing to assess Service requirements. The program statement was forwarded to JDDs at the end of March 2001. **POC: Team E**
JSTARS: *MTTP for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System* **(SECRET)**	Mar 02	A: FM 2-00.1 M: MCRP 2-2B N: NWP 3-55.13 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.2	This publication has been assessed and is being retained until the release of JP 3-55 *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Target Acquisition (TA)*. ALSA will host a joint working group with the goal of producing a draft JSTARS annex for the Services to add to JP 3-55. If the level of detail in the final, approved JP 3-55 is not sufficient, ALSA will revise the JSTARS MTTP. **POC: Team G**
TACTICAL RADIO (Revision of TALK-II-SINCGARS)	Dec 01	A: FM 6-02.72 M: MCRP 6-2.2.2 N: NWP 3-13.1 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.18	This MTTP will describe and discuss current voice and tactical radios systems used in common between the Services. It will incorporate current updates and changes to SINCGARS through the Advanced System Improvement Plan (ASIP), the Internet Controller (INC), and Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS). This publication will include analog as well as digital operations (interoperability) in a joint environment. The first draft has been sent out for comment. **POC: Team B**
UXO (Revision): *Multi-Service Procedures for Unexploded Explosive Ordnance Operations*	May 01	A: FM 3-100.38 M: MCRP 4-5.1 N: NWP TP 3-02.4.1 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.12	Provides multi-Service methodologies for planning, coordinating, and executing UXO reporting, avoidance, and clearance procedures. The signature draft was sent to the Services on 9 Mar 01 **POC: Team D**

Team A: MAJ Mark Caruso & Maj Mark Delong
Team B: LTC Lou Schurott & Lt Col Steve Jenkins
Team C: LTC Joe Patykula & Maj Billy Lucas
Team D: MAJ Rick Starkey & Maj Barbara Romano
Team E: CDR Jim Woodard & Lt Col "R. G." McManus
Team F: Lt Col Mark Brown & LTC Kevin Kirmse
Team G: LTC Elizabeth Bilyeu & Maj "Soup" Campbell

ALSA PUBLICATIONS UNDER REVISION

TITLE	DATE
AMCI: *Army and Marine Corps Integration in Joint Operations*	**MAY 96**
ARM-J: *Antiradiation Missile Employment in a Joint Environment* **(Distribution Restriction)**	**JUN 95**
BREVITY: *Multi-Service Air-Air, Air-Surface, Surface-Air Brevity Codes*	**APR 97**
J-FIRE: *Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower*	**NOV 97**
TALK II-SINCGARS: *Multi-Service Communications Procedures for the Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System*	**MAY 96**
UXO: *Multi-Service Procedures for Unexploded Explosive Ordnance Operations*	**JUN 96**

For more information on ALSA publications, visit our website at *www.dtic.mil/alsa*

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND (SPJ5X)

By LCol Robert S. MacLeod, Canadian Forces

JOINT PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST UPDATE

JP 3-14, *Joint Doctrine for Space Operations*. In July 2000, JP 3-14 was delivered to the Joint Staff (JS) doctrine sponsor, JS J3, for preliminary coordination. In December 2000, JS J38 hosted a joint working group to resolve contentious issues received during preliminary coordination from the joint doctrine development community. The resultant, numerous changes were incorporated and final coordination will begin in the near future. Approval is expected in late August 2001 or early September 2001.

JP 3-14.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space Control*. In October 2000, the Joint Doctrine Working Party authorized development of JTTP for space control. Development of the program directive (PD) was put on hold until the final coordination version of JP 3-14 was distributed. Subsequently, a PD development group will convene to finalize the draft PD for distribution to the joint doctrine development community for review and comment.

JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, has been recommended for an early revision. A proposed revision PD was distributed for preliminary coordination in December 2000. Due to the numerous critical and major comments on the revision PD, a PD development group was convened in the Pentagon on 4 April 2001 to resolve the contentious issues.

(26th JDWP summary continued from page 16)

available on the Internet by September 2001 and version 1.0 by 2002. Mr. Winston Schmidt from OC, Incorporated provided a pre-prototype JDEIS demonstration.

Lt Col John Hyten from JS J38 (Interoperability and Space Operations Division described some joint mission areas (JMAs)—a functional group of joint tasks and activities that share a common purpose and facilitate joint force operations and interoperability.

Lt Col Nate Toth from USJFCOM JWFC Doctrine Division discussed the linkage of future concepts with the joint doctrine development process.

LTC Rich Cardillo from USJFCOM JWFC Doctrine Division suggested that the joint doctrine development community start transforming the joint doctrine hierarchy by eliminating some publications, consolidating others, realigning assessments with JMAs, only producing "above the line" publications, and realigning the "below the line" hierarchy along JMAs.

CDR (Ret) Peter Mannering from the United Kingdom, Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre discussed the allied joint publications (AJP) program, its development, and hierarchy. CAPT Russell stated that JDEIS is developing a policy for reviewing AJPs.

Colonel Robert Ditch from Joint Task Force—Civil Support (JTF-CS) recommended revising Chapter IV in JP 3-07.7 to reflect current JTF-CS operational concepts and developing a fast-track JP on *Domestic CBRNE Consequence Management* with JTF-CS as the LA—no action was taken on the recommendations.

Mr. Roger Blankenship from the JS Inspector General noted they are working with OC, Incorporated to review JP 3-11 and the Consequence Management Handbook.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

CAPT Russell stated that JDETD will **post emerging concept papers** and policy documents on the Chairman's Joint Doctrine website.

Mr. Bounds from the USA noted that **JDEIS** does not address the problem—providing the joint answer on a subject, not the answer from various publications. Lt Col Smith stated that JDEIS is coming online in 2002, but JDETD is not turning off the JPs—there will be a transition period.

LtCol Triplett from MCCDC suggested that the joint doctrine development community immediately begin to **align joint publications with the JMAs** and consolidate the JTTPs with the associated doctrine—there was no consensus reached.

CDR deGozzaldi explained that **JPs 3-50 and 3-50.1** have been replaced by the National SAR plan and other approved documents and **can be removed from the hierarchy** per the guidance in the JP 3-49 PD. There was no objection from the members.

CAPT Russell announced **the next JDWP would be held during April (now May) 2001 and the theme would be "future joint doctrine."**

DOCTRINAL RESEARCH (In the Internet Age)

By Richard J. Rinaldo

PURPOSE

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it is to provide some general thoughts about doctrinal research. Second, it is to cite some specific Internet resources for conducting doctrinal research.

WHY RESEARCH?

The inscription carved in stone at the entrance to the National Archives says, "What is past is prologue." Heeding that inscription is at the heart of doctrinal research, which is part of doctrine development. Indeed, the distinguished scholar of doctrine, MG I. B. Holley Jr., tells us that "the search for doctrine becomes a matter of discovering the best way to arrive at sound generalizations."[1] The collection or information-gathering phase is the first phase of that discovery process. Holley says that this means that you study the evidence "from a variety of cases, which is to say, experience which has been recorded."[2] These are some of the concrete reasons for doctrine research:

- Helps avoid use of obsolete information

- Helps avoid redundancy

- Lends authority to assertions

- Provides illustrative material to explain or show application of an idea

- May demonstrate the possibility of an effect

- Lends to accuracy, currency, and completeness

- Offers ideas for doctrinal solutions

But the researcher should be careful, especially about cause and effect. War is chameleon like, and what may apply in one situation does not always fit another. A peacekeeping approach, for example, might have worked in the Sinai but it did not work in Bosnia during the earliest stages of foreign involvement.

On a more abstract level and consistent with MG Holley's thinking, the French theorist, H. Poincaré tells us that the discovery process has four stages—preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification.[3]

Research plays a part in each of these stages as the discovery process applies to doctrinal challenges. The search for information about a topic (*preparation*) builds to provide the critical mass of information (*incubation*) which will spark those connections and hatch those ideas that lead to "I think that's it" (*illumination*). Finally research helps to verify the truth of doctrinal assertions (*verification*). It does so with the caution that no circumstances are exactly alike, which is why some say that doctrine, albeit authoritative, requires judgment in application.

WHAT SHOULD WE RESEARCH?

Most of the sources cited below are fairly obvious. Some, such as private sector practices, are not. Yet, for example, an article in a military journal cites Wal-Mart, the New York Police Department, and a securities trading firm in discussing network-centric warfare, a topic of increasing interest to the US military.[4] Similarly don't neglect people outside the military. For example, Ambassador Robert B. Oakley served admirably as a member of a senior review group in the development of the Army's FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*.

- Guidance, policy, law, National Military Strategy, National Security Strategy, Presidential Decision Directives

- Visits and interviews with commanders and staffs

- Related publications and doctrine: Army, joint, multinational, interagency

- Private sector best practices

- Fiction and the arts, including movies

- Subject matter experts (active, retired, private sector, and other agencies)

- Instructors at military schools and colleges

- Future visions and concepts

- Experiments, exercises, wargames, seminars, simulations, and conferences

- History, briefings, lessons learned, and after-action reviews

- Articles, studies, reports, including those of "think tanks," associations, and contractors

- Professional journals

- Student monographs, especially from advanced and war college students

- Student texts and lesson plans used in professional military education

- Government reports, especially from the Government Accounting Office (GAO)

- Libraries and bibliographies

- News, especially the Early Bird and Early Bird Supplement

Fiction is an area that might raise eyebrows. Yet, if our doctrine is about the human condition, fighting wars or executing difficult endeavors, then fiction has a lot to offer—to illustrate or illuminate, to heighten awareness, or to lend realism to the topic. The historical fiction of Michael Shaara's *Killer Angels* could have been the inspiration for the discussion of the third day of the Battle of Gettysburg, which appears in the Army's manual on leadership.[5] The manual also was written, at least in part, by a novelist. Fiction may not have such a direct play in doctrinal research in most cases, but paradoxically, it will serve to hone the doctrine writer's sense of truth. Movies and TV productions such as World War II documentaries also may assist research.[6]

History is, in the traditional sense, recorded experience a bit older than the most recent exercise at Hohenlfels, Germany or Marine Corps Base Twenty-Nine Palms, CA. There are many views about history—the great Spanish philosopher Santayana said, "Those who ignore the past are condemned to repeat it." The well-known British theorist Sir B. H. Liddell Hart would agree saying that "it provides us with the opportunity to profit by the stumbles and tumbles of our forerunners." General George S. Patton said, "To be a successful soldier you must know history." There is a major place for history in doctrine development, but be careful—Henry Ford allegedly said that history is bunk. Future visions and new concepts also should be viewed in a cautionary way, since doctrine is based on current capabilities rather than those being conceived or under development. General Donn A. Starry's seminal statement on *Operational Concepts and Doctrine* points out that "Concepts are not doctrine until tested, approved, and accepted."[7]

The other items listed have proven fruitful—especially reports from the GAO. Why redo the extensive research that has already been done on military topics by its talented and persistent researchers? The *Early Bird* and its supplement also are invaluable. These are the early warning systems for doctrinal need. History and lessons learned may be the main body of doctrinal development; but the topics, issues, and events described in the *Early Bird* collection often place researchers on the trail to required doctrine. They also are full of useful information and insights about policy, and doctrine must align with policy.

Finally, our military libraries deserve special mention. Many if not all are extremely well-wired, have personnel who are trained, talented, and helpful, can borrow from many sources, have answered the question before, and can save the researcher a lot of time.

INTERNET RESOURCES

In 1996, Jim Kievit and Steve Metz, both from the Army War College, wrote about the Internet as a resource for military strategic analysis stating that it was not "a solution to the analyst's need for relevant, timely information."[8] Less than three years later, Kievit said that any military related research should start with the Internet.[9] Further, the Commerce Department Report, *Digital Economy 2000*, points out that, "according to Inktomi and the NEC Research Institute, the amount of information available online has increased ten-fold over the last three years, to more than a billion discrete pages . . . In January 2000 the World Wide Web contained more than one billion unique pages, compared to 100 million in October 1997."[10] By the end of 2000 the number increased to three billion.[11] The site, *google.com*, can search 42 percent of nearly 1.25 billion pages.[12] Google also is the first major search engine to include "portable document format or PDF" files, and in many cases a "Text Version" link appears in its search results. A pay-for-use search service Lexis-Nexis, available in many military libraries, has about 3.2 billion searchable documents.[13]

So what? The "what" is that "more information will be produced in the next three years than has been produced in all time."[14] With the vast amount of information available, to include the body of lessons learned and historical material about military art and science, the Internet or something like it must be used to search for and retrieve that information for use in developing military doctrine.

The Internet does in fact provide wide access and collaborative advantage, speed of access, and vast storage and linkage capabilities. At the same time, use requires special attention to accuracy and reliability and the need to cull voluminous data. Moreover, there is a lot of volatility of addresses as citations. As a way to distribute doctrinal research material or doctrine itself, the Internet also requires security considerations.

Lessons Learned. Notwithstanding any caveats the Internet and its restricted-access counterpart, the Secret Internet Protocol Routing Network (SIPRNET), have a lot to offer. For example, doctrine should not be developed without reviewing military lessons learned.

- The US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) manages the Joint After Action

Reporting System Database. It is available on their SIPRNET website at *http://jcll.jwfc.jfcom.smil.mil*. The JCLL also publishes The Joint Center for Lessons Learned Bulletin, available on the Internet at a password-protected website. One can access the site through the USJFCOM JWFC homepage at *http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil/*.

- Similarly, the US Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has a website, which also is a door to other valuable sources of doctrinal information to include joint and Service doctrine and the Foreign Military Studies Office homepage. The latter includes an excellent compilation of alphabetized research links. CALL has an extensive database of after action reviews. CALL also publishes "special editions" that focus on a specific operation, such as in Bosnia, and News From the Front, which include short articles that focus on solutions to specific problems. It also produces longer newsletters; which provide tactics, techniques, and procedures for units. CALL products are both unrestricted and restricted, which require a user identification and password. The CALL site is at *http://call.army.mil/call.html*.

Joint Doctrine on the Internet

- USJFCOM JWFC has developed a **Joint Digital Library System** that is an **online-searchable database** containing joint publications, CJCS directives, DOD directives, peace operations and consequence management documents, joint experimentation information, and other research materials. This site should be your first online visit when conducting doctrine, peace operations, or consequence management research. Go to *http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil/genpublic/library.html*. See page 8 for more information.

- Approved and draft (password protected) joint publications, CJCS directives, key Service publications, history publications (e.g., Operation JUST CAUSE-Panama, 1995), and other research papers (e.g., A Doctrinal Statement Of Selected Joint Operational Concepts by General Colin L. Powell, 10 November 1992) are available for review or download from the **Joint Electronic Library on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Doctrine Internet site at *http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine***. This site also has a wealth of other research material (e.g., *Joint Vision 2020*) and doctrine-related training materials (e.g., Doctrine Networked Education and Training).

Search engines. My favorites are *google.com* and *northernlight.com*. There are many others and there also are sites where you can get search engine information. There is a site titled "Best Search Engines" at *http://kresch.com/*. On this page you will find a reference to Meta Search Engines, which some experts say is the best way to start your search. The University of California services a site for a tutorial on finding information on the Internet at the Berkeley Library *http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/TeachingLib/Guides/Internet/FindInfo.html*. The site contains a link to handouts for the tutorial.

Government and Related Sites. Some sites that include or are devoted to military topics besides those already noted include:

- *http://www.firstgov.com/* contains links to numerous government topics, including defense.

- *http://www.defenselink.mil/* is the portal to Department of Defense (DOD) and is searchable.

- *http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/* includes a searchable library.

- *http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/db2.html* contains government publications

- *http://web7.whs.osd.mil/corres.htm* contains DOD directives and instructions.

- *http://www-tradoc.army.mil/*. A biased view says that everybody is still playing catch-up. This site has links to the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) and the Command and General Staff College, where *http://www-cgsc.army.mil/cdd/index.htm* also links to doctrine-related sites for all Army branches and most Services.

- *http://www.fas.org/man/doctrine.htm*. Though found at the CADD site, the Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network deserves special mention and is a comprehensive site, though it is rapidly becoming dated. It contains the quote, "*The Army has doctrine, the Navy has tradition, and the Air Force is new.*"

- *http://dodimagery.afis.osd.mil/*. The Armed Forces Information Service produces imagery that could enhance doctrinal products.

CONCLUSION

Many doctrine researchers probably have learned much of the above through experience and hard work. This article will have served its purpose if it sparks some new insight or suggests some new source that will enhance the doctrine development process.

ENDNOTES

[1] MG I. B. Holley Jr., "The Doctrinal Process: Some Suggested Steps," *Military Review*, Apr. 1979.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Michael Polyanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Towards A Post-Critical Philosophy* (New York, N.Y.: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), 121.

[4] Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," *Naval Institute Proceedings*, Jan. 1998.

[5] FM 22-100, Army *Leadership: Be, Know, Do* (Wash., DC: U.S. Department of the Army, Aug. 1999), Chapter 1.

[6] Major Frederick A. Eiserman, *War on Film: Military History Education* (Fort Leavenworth, KS, Combat Studies Institute, 1987).

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[10] *Digital Economy 2000* (Wash., DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, June 2000), accessed 26 Mar. 2001, available from *http://www.esa.doc.gov/*.

[11] David Lake, "Engines Idling Roughly," *Metrics Report, TheStandard.com*, 13 Feb. 2001: 5.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Lynn Walford, "Library Sites Can Be Useful When doing Online Research," *Investor's Business Daily*, 5 Apr. 2001: A13.

[14] Brian Deagon, "Information Exploding by the Petrabyte," *Investor's Business Daily*, 6 Nov. 2000: A8.

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KEY INTERNET/SIPRNET SITES

CJCS Joint Doctrine:

- NIPRNET: *http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine*
- SIPRNET: *http://nmcc20a.nmcc.smil.mil/ usersdj9j7ead/doctrine/index.htm*
- DOCNET: *http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine tointer.htm*

Presidential Directives and Executive Orders:
   http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/direct.htm

DOD Directives: *http://www.defenselink.mil/*

Joint Chiefs of Staff: *http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/*

USJFCOM JWFC: *http://www.jtasc.jfcom.mil/*

JWFC Research Library: *http://elib1.jwfc.js.mil*

Joint Center for Lessons Learned Database:

- NIPRNET: *http://www-secure.jwfc.jfcom. mil /protected/jcll*
- SIPRNET: *http://www.jcll.jwfc.jfcom. smil.mil*

Army Training and Doctrine Digital Library:
   http://155.217.58.58/atdls.htm

TRADOC: *http://www-tradoc.army.mil/*

Center for Army Lessons Learned:
   http://call.army.mil/

Naval Warfare Development Command:
   http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/

Navy Online: *http://www.ncts.navy.mil/nol/*

Navy Directives: *http://neds.nebt.daps.mil/*

Air Force Doctrine Center:
   http://www.hqafdc.maxwell.af.mil/Main.asp

MCCDC, Doctrine Division:
   http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil/

Marine Corps Lessons Learned:
   http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/wwwlibrary/ 2mccls.htm

USEUCOM Publications:
   http://www.eucom.milpublications/index.htm

Air Land Sea Application Center:

- NIPRNET: *http://www.dtic.mil/alsa*
- SIPRNET: *http://wwwacc.langley.af.smil.mil/ alsa*

TERMINOLOGY

By Mr. Tom Barrows, USJFCOM JWFC, Doctrine Support Group

> *"Generals and admirals stress the central importance of "doctrine." Military doctrine is the "logic" of their professional behavior. As such, it is a synthesis of scientific knowledge and expertise on the one hand, and of traditions and political assumptions on the other."*
>
> **Morris Janowitz:**
> ***The Professional Soldier*, 1960**

As we take a glimpse at future doctrine and all that it entails, we must be cognizant of the present and the past, at least the immediate past. As Professor Janowitz notes above, doctrine is the synthesis of two main branches, one being scientific knowledge and expertise and the other traditions and political assumptions. As we grapple with ideas and paradigm shifts for the future, we undoubtedly will struggle with new terminology. In some cases, this terminology struggle already has begun. For example, "focused logistics" has been proposed in a couple of publications in the JP 4-0 series.

The US Joint Forces Command Joint Experimentation Directorate (J9) has published several "white papers" that deal with emerging ideas and concepts for the conduct of military activities across the range of military operations, and they plan to publish several more. These "white papers" have been and are being developed by analysts who have been directed to "think outside the box." These analysts also are charged to preview and incorporate emerging technology in the "white papers" concepts. Topics published so far include "adaptive joint command and control (AJC2)," "attack operations against critical mobile targets (AOACMT)," "common relevant operational picture (CROP)," "focused logistics: enabling early decisive operations (FLEEDO)," "joint interactive planning (JIP)," and "strategic deployment (SD)."

We joint doctrine developers, on the other hand, always have been required to focus our efforts "within the box," i.e., develop our doctrine using extant or existing capabilities. We also have been bound by fairly strict terminology rules, as well we should have. As we put the finishing touches on rounding out the joint doctrine hierarchy in the next year and a half or so, we need to be especially mindful of the emerging future concepts and terminology creeping into the joint doctrine arena even as you read this column.

In my view, the single most important aspect of this merger of established/approved joint doctrine and the future concepts is the terminology. We must insist upon clearly defined terms and we must ensure that these terms,

when adopted, also are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. (Speaking of JP 1-02, the newest hard copy version is at the office of the Director of the Joint Staff for signature. This most requested JP should be approved, printed, and distributed in the near future.)

Remember what Professor Janowitz said about expertise and traditions being key elements of doctrine. I believe that the generals and admirals will remember and ensure that futures concepts (and the attendant terminology) are incorporated in joint doctrine in a logical and manageable fashion. Be careful out there!

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- The JEL on the World Wide Web can be found at *http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine* or on SIPRNET at *nmcc20a.nmcc.smil.mil/users/dj9j7ead/doctrine/index.html*. It is updated routinely and contains all approved JPs which may be electronically downloaded (pdf format) for local distribution or read with Acrobat Reader (also available for download).

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